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The International Promotion of Political Norms in Eastern Europe:  
A Qualitative Comparative Analysis
φ 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After the end of the Cold War, the main regional organizations of Europe – the European 
Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe 
(CoE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – 
proclaimed human rights, liberal democracy, and peaceful conflict management to be the 
normative foundations of the New Europe.
2 Moreover, they defined support for political 
change as a new core task for themselves. They provided expertise and training to the 
transformation countries, gave financial support to the emerging civil societies and 
parties, and mediated in cases of conflict. They monitored the establishment and 
functioning of democratic institutions and the rule of law; they made financial assistance 
and the integration of the transformation countries into the Western organizations 
dependent upon compliance with their political norms and, in a few instances, intervened 
militarily to stop civil war and massive human rights violations or (such as in Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Kosovo, or Macedonia). 
 
About one and a half decades later, ten consolidated East European democracies 
are or are about to become EU and NATO members. By contrast, other countries of the 
region (most of them in the Balkans) have not yet achieved democratic stability. Others 
still, mainly successor states of the Soviet Union, are consolidating autocracies rather 
than democracies. These divergent developments raise the question under which 
conditions European organizations have had an effective impact on compliance with 
norms of human rights, liberal democracy, and peaceful conflict management in Eastern 
Europe. 
  
In answering this question, the article starts from two basic models of international rule 
promotion – external incentives and social learning – used in different strands of 
International Relations research. First, in the context of the rationalist-constructivist 
debate in International Relations, constructivist scholars have begun to develop 
theoretical accounts of “international socialization” that go beyond the material 
bargaining frameworks dominant in rationalist IR theory (for overviews, see Finnemore 
1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998; Checkel 2004). These accounts are based on 
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2 See, for instance, the 1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe.   2
processes of social influence (Johnston 2001), argumentation (Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 
1999) or persuasion (Checkel 2001) and include deep effects of interest and identity 
change. Second, the literature on international conditionality, which focuses mostly on 
the lending conditionality of International Financial Institutions (IFIs), also contrasts 
bargaining and social learning models and arrives at a skeptical assessment of the 
effectiveness of bargaining conditionality (see e.g. Kahler 1992; cf. Checkel 2000). 
Similarly, the literature on “Europeanization”, the impact of the EU on member state 
institutions, political processes, and policies, distinguishes “domestic change as a process 
of redistribution of resources” from “domestic change as a process of socialization and 
learning” (Börzel and Risse 2003; cf. Héritier et al. 2001).  
 
Both models identify different conditions as crucial for the effectiveness of 
international norm promotion. Whereas the external incentives model focuses on the size 
and credibility of incentives provided by international organizations as well as domestic 
veto points and costs of adaptation, the socialization accounts emphasize the authority of 
the socialization agency, the legitimacy and domestic resonance of the norms, and the 
identity and cognitive priors of the target actors. In this article, I will test the causal 
relevance of the explanatory factors suggested by both models in a comparative analysis. 
 
This test seeks to go beyond existing research on the international promotion of 
political norms in Eastern Europe.
3 While there are numerous case studies in this field 
(see e.g. Linden 2000; 2002; Pridham 2001; 2002; Zielonka and Pravda 2001), systematic 
theoretical and comparative research is only just emerging (Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; 
see also Vachudova forthcoming). These studies mostly employ a similar theoretical 
framework contrasting rationalist and constructivist mechanisms and conditions. Paul 
Kubicek and his collaborators study seven countries and evaluate twelve variables 
stemming from a “convergence” (social learning) and a “conditionality” (external 
incentives) framework. However, the cases are aggregated at the country level, which is 
problematic because conditions vary between issue-areas and are subject to change over 
time. Moreover, the design of their comparison does not permit a rigorous analysis of the 
explanatory power of the independent variables.
4  
 
In contrast, Judith Kelley (2004) conducts a statistical analysis at the level of 
individual issues at various time points and finds that external incentives were generally 
necessary to overcome domestic opposition and bring about policy change. However, her 
cases are limited to issues of ethnic conflict and minority rights in four Eastern European 
countries. Finally, Jon Pevehouse (2002a; 2002b) analyzes – and confirms – the influence 
of regional organizations on democratic transitions and consolidation more generally. He 
does not, however, distinguish between the influences of external incentives and social 
learning in his empirical analysis and his data ends with 1992, that is, before the period of 
democratic consolidation in Central and Eastern Europe.  
                                                           
3 I do not take into consideration here the literature on the transfer of specific policy rules. See. 
e.g. Jacoby forthcoming. 
 
4 The same criticism applies to previous work by me and my collaborators. See e.g. 
Schimmelfennig, Engert and Knobel (2003).   3
 
To overcome the limits of these studies and check their results, this article covers 
various issues (authoritarian rule, minority conflict, secession) across different time 
periods in nine diverse countries – Belarus, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Montenegro, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Turkey. In addition, it uses the techniques of 
combinatorial logic in Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) to analyze the 42 
conditional configurations resulting from this diversity, to assess the conditions of 
effective incentives and learning, and to determine which of them were necessary and/or 
sufficient for political change. 
 
The results largely corroborate the external incentives model. Credible EU (and, for 
some countries, NATO) membership incentives and low domestic adaptation costs are 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of compliance. However, the 
combination of credible incentives and low costs is not the only sufficient condition of 
effective international impact. In particular in the final phases of negotiations to open and 
conclude accession negotiations, credible membership incentives work in conjunction 
with a Western or European identity of the target government, too – even if compliance 
threatens the survival of the target government. In contrast, the social learning model fails 
to explain compliance. Identity was relevant only in combination with incentives, and the 
other conditions tested here (legitimacy and resonance) were not systematically related to 
the effectiveness of international norm promotion. 
 
The remainder of the article is organized as follows: in the next section, I will discuss 
the models and the conditions and hypotheses to be tested. Subsequent sections introduce 
the QCA method, conceptualize the variables for the QCA analysis, and describe briefly 
the cases. The final two sections discuss the comparative analysis and draw conclusions 
from it. 
 
 
Theory: External Incentives and Social Learning 
 
The analysis is based on two alternative models of international influence on domestic 
change: the external incentives model and the social learning model (Schimmelfennig 
and Sedelmeier forthcoming).  
 
The External Incentives Model 
 
The external incentives model is a rationalist bargaining model. The actors involved are 
assumed to be strategic utility-maximizers interested in the maximization of their own 
power and welfare. In a bargaining process, they exchange information, threats and 
promises; its outcome depends on their relative bargaining power. According to the 
external incentives model, the relevant strategy of the European international 
organizations is political conditionality: the organizations set their liberal democratic 
norms as conditions that the Eastern European countries have to fulfill in order to receive 
rewards specified in advance. These rewards consist of assistance and institutional ties 
ranging from trade and cooperation agreements via association agreements to full   4
membership. Regional organizations pay the reward if the target government complies 
with the conditions and withhold the reward if it fails to comply. They do not, however, 
intervene either coercively or supportively to change the cost-benefit assessment and 
subsequent behavior of the target government by inflicting extra costs or providing 
additional, unconditional assistance.
5  
  
The analytical starting point of the bargaining process is a domestic status quo, 
which differs to some extent from an EU rule. This status quo is conceived as a 
“domestic equilibrium” reflecting the current distribution of preferences and bargaining 
power in domestic society. EU conditionality upsets this domestic equilibrium by 
introducing (additional) incentives for compliance with EU rules into the game. The most 
general proposition of the external incentives model is therefore that a state complies 
with the norms of the organization if the benefits of the rewards exceed the domestic 
adoption costs. More specifically, this cost-benefit balance depends on the size and 
credibility of international rewards, on the one hand, and the size of domestic adoption 
costs, on the other.  
 
Size and Credibility of International Rewards 
 
The size of the international reward depends on its quality and its quantity. With regard to 
quality, I propose that tangible, material incentives – those which enhance the welfare, 
security or power of the target government – are most likely to have a sufficiently strong 
impact to bring about compliance. The underlying logic of this proposition is that, to the 
extent that compliance with liberal democratic norms is perceived to threaten the security 
and the power of the state and the government of the day, these disincentives need to be 
balanced by positive incentives of the same kind. By extension, international 
organizations that are able to offer such incentives are more likely to have an impact than 
those that do not. Specifically, the EU and NATO, which both provide the highest 
economic and security benefits available from European international organizations, will 
potentially be most effective in inducing compliance. By contrast, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe offer mainly social rewards – such as international legitimacy – and 
soft security. Therefore their influence is unlikely to be effective without support of the 
EU or NATO.  
 
With regard to quantity, the higher the welfare, security, and power benefits 
offered by the international organizations are, the more likely the target states will 
comply. For example, the offer of EU membership will be more effective than that of 
mere association, and NATO membership with full security guarantees will have a 
stronger impact than NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  
 
In addition, the international incentives need to be credible – both with regard to 
the regional organization’s threat to withhold rewards in case of non-compliance and, 
conversely, its promise to deliver the reward in case of rule adoption. In other words, 
effective political conditionality requires, first, the superior bargaining power of the 
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Schimmelfennig et al. (2003).   5
external agency (otherwise threats would not be credible). Second, on the part of the 
target states, it requires certainty about the conditional payments (otherwise promises 
would not be credible). 
  The credibility of the threat of exclusion is generally high in the relationship 
between European regional organizations and the target countries of democratic 
conditionality in Eastern Europe. Due to the highly asymmetrical interdependence that 
characterizes this relationship, the organizations possess superior bargaining power. 
Eastern Europe is only of marginal importance to the economy and security of the EU 
and NATO member states. In contrast, the region is heavily dependent on the EU market 
and will benefit much more strongly from accession than the EU member states 
(Baldwin, Francois and Portes 1997; Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003: 46-52). Likewise, 
it has faced higher insecurity in the post-Cold War era than Western Europe due to 
uncertainty about the course of foreign policy of neighboring Russia and ethno-
nationalistic conflict. Thus, the region also benefits more strongly from NATO 
membership than the old member states benefit from NATO enlargement. Both 
asymmetries enhance the bargaining power of the main Western organizations. 
  
The main issue, therefore, has been the credibility of the promises. To be credible, 
the regional organizations must be capable of paying the rewards (at a low cost to 
themselves). 
 
First, promises are not credible if they go beyond capabilities. Second, the higher 
the costs of the rewards are to the organization, the more doubtful their eventual payment 
to the target countries will be. On the basis of this reasoning, intangible, social rewards 
have been more credible than tangible material rewards, and assistance and association 
have been more credible rewards than accession. Eastern enlargement involves 
substantial costs to the EU and NATO, which – although far from being prohibitive – are 
likely to exceed the marginal benefits of the member states (Schimmelfennig 2003: 37-
62).  
  However, one also has to take into account the “sunk costs” of rewarding. In 
contrast to assistance, which requires comparatively small investments and can be 
stopped rather easily, enlargement involves costly, long-term negotiations and 
preparations and – in the case of the EU – a restructuring of institutions and policies. The 
further the pre-accession process advances, the higher are the costs of withholding the 
reward, that is, the investments that would be lost if the process was broken off or 
postponed to sanction a candidate state. Therefore, the credibility of promises in 
enlargement conditionality increases over time as the credibility of threats decreases. 
Moreover, the opening of accession negotiations with, and the subsequent accession of, a 
first group of candidate countries to the EU and NATO increased the credibility of 
rewards for the remaining candidates, as it demonstrated that the Western organizations 
were serious about enlargement. 
 
In addition, political conditionality must be consistent to be credible. If 
international organizations were perceived to subordinate conditionality to other political, 
strategic, or economic considerations, the target state might either hope to receive the 
benefits without fulfilling the conditions or conclude that it will not receive the rewards at   6
any rate. Moreover, the effectiveness of conditionality would suffer if organizations used 
different conditions or different criteria for measuring fulfillment.  
Of course, the political conditions of membership varied. The membership criteria 
of the CoE were stricter than those of the OSCE, and less strict than those of the EU and 
NATO. This has not been problematic, however, because conditions complemented 
rather than contradicted each other, and organizations with stricter conditions also offered 
higher rewards. EU political conditions have been in line with recommendations and 
demands of the OSCE and the Council of Europe (CE), that is, those European 
organizations most directly concerned with the human and minority rights situation in the 
CEECs. Moreover, they were reinforced by the fact that NATO had made accession 
subject to the same conditions as the EU. Thus, target countries could not play one 
organization off against another and reap high benefits in spite of non-compliance.  
 
Domestic Costs 
 
If target states are confronted with credible conditionality, and if they are offered equally 
beneficial rewards, the external incentives model postulates that the size of domestic 
adoption costs determines whether they will accept or reject the conditions. We assume 
that adoption is always costly – otherwise it would have taken place in the absence of 
conditionality. For the purpose of this study, we focus on the domestic political or power 
costs of governments.  
 
First, the liberal democratic norms, which are the subject of political conditionality, 
usually limit the autonomy and power of governments. They prohibit certain 
undemocratic and illiberal practices on which a government may rely to preserve its 
power – such as suppressing opposition parties or civic associations, curbing the freedom 
of the press, or rigging elections. Moreover, they may change power relations between 
governmental actors – such as increasing the independence of courts or limiting the 
political influence of the military. Finally, above all in the case of minority rights, they 
affect the composition of the citizenship and empower certain social and ethnic groups. 
This may erode the social power base of governments and, in their opinion, threaten the 
security, integrity, and identity of the state.  
 
Second, in the Eastern European countries, the number of societal veto players is 
generally considered to be small (Dimitrova 2002: 176; Schimmelfennig, Engert and 
Knobel 2003: 498-499). Political parties have been organized top-down, are weakly 
rooted in society and social organizations, and depend on the state for their resources. 
Industrial relations are generally characterized by a state-dominated corporatism (in many 
cases even patrimonial networks), and an active civil society has failed to emerge despite 
promising beginnings in the revolutions of 1989. Rather, levels of political participation 
have declined.
6 This characteristic of societal weakness also holds for Turkey.  
 
                                                           
6 For general assessments along this line, see, e.g., Ágh (1998: 52 and 106); Birch (2000: 15-16); 
Kaldor and Vejvoda (1999: 11, 19-22); Merkel (1999: 494-532); Sitter (2001: 75-76, 87).   7
In sum, I propose the following hypothesis based on the external incentives model: The 
likelihood of compliance increases, as the size and credibility of international rewards 
increase and the power costs of compliance for the target government decrease. 
  
The Social Learning Model 
 
The social learning model follows core tenets of social constructivism. It has informed 
studies of international socialization in general (Checkel 2001) and constitutes the most 
prominent alternative to rationalist explanations of conditionality (Checkel 2000; Kahler 
1992) and Europeanization (Börzel and Risse 2003).  In contrast with the rationalist 
model of conditionality, the social learning model assumes a logic of appropriateness 
(March and Olsen 1989: 160-161). According to this logic, the actors involved are 
motivated by internalized identities, values, and norms. Among alternative courses of 
action, they choose the (most) appropriate or legitimate one. Correspondingly, arguing 
about the legitimacy of rules and the appropriateness of behavior (rather than bargaining 
about conditions and rewards), persuasion (rather than coercion), and “complex” learning 
(rather than behavioral adaptation) characterize the process of rule transfer and rule 
adoption.  
 
In this perspective, European regional organizations represent a European 
international community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of 
common values and norms. Whether a non-member state adopts the community’s rules 
depends on the degree to which it regards them as appropriate in light of this collective 
identity, values, and norms (Schimmelfennig 2003: 83-90). The most general proposition 
of the social learning model therefore is: a state complies with the norms of the 
organization if it is persuaded of their appropriateness.  
 
The sociological institutionalist literature distinguishes three main mechanisms of 
social learning: imitation, argumentation and influence (see e.g. Checkel 2004; Johnston 
2001).
7 According to the mechanism of imitation, the community norms are templates 
that help actors understand and interpret social situations and provide scripts for the roles 
that they are supposed to play in the international community. The socialization agency 
provides a role model and demonstrates appropriate ways of behavior, which the target 
states learn through dense contacts and role-playing. Typically, the socializees adopt 
international norms as a result of unreflective processes of habitualization. 
 
The argumentation mechanism postulates that community norms are normative 
validity claims argumentatively justified by the socialization agencies in international 
discourses. Thanks to the “power of the better argument”, the target actors are persuaded 
by the legitimacy of the validity claims and change their identity and interests 
accordingly (Checkel 2001; Risse 2000). Thus, according to this mechanism, social 
learning implies a reflective process of normative internalization. 
                                                           
7 Note that the labels for these mechanisms vary in the literature. For instance, Johnston (2001) 
distinguishes “persuasion” (here: argumentation) and “social influence”; Checkel (2004) calls the three 
mechanisms “role playing”, “normative suasion” and “strategic calculation” (subsuming both social and 
material incentives).   8
 
Finally, social influence is based on the use of social incentives and disincentives 
(such as image or status; Johnston 2001). Social rewards (such as popularity, respect, a 
positive image) require the adoption of the community norms. Otherwise, the target states 
are threatened with social punishments (such as shaming and shunning). 
 
Interestingly, however, the literature has identified a fairly consistent catalogue of 
favorable conditions for all three mechanisms of social learning (Checkel 2001: 562-563; 
Johnston 2001: 498-499; Risse 2000: 19). Because of this common set of conditions, a 
single social learning model can be specified and tested, even though the test will not 
permit any direct observation and differentiation of the mechanisms. The common 
conditions are: novelty, legitimacy, identity, authority, and resonance. 
 
Novelty. First, social learning is most likely to be effective, if the target actor “is 
in a novel and uncertain environment” (Checkel 2001: 562). “Novices” are prone to 
engage in role-playing, listen seriously to the arguments of international organizations, 
and seek international recognition and a favorable image. They compensate their 
uncertainty by taking clues from their social environment. 
 
Legitimacy.  Legitimacy refers to the normative quality of the regional 
organizations’ norms. According to Thomas Franck, compliance will depend on “the 
clarity with which the rules communicate, the integrity of the process by which they were 
made and are applied, their venerable pedigree and conceptual coherence. In short, it is 
the legitimacy of the rules which conduces to their being respected.” (1990: 38; cf. also 
1990: 49). Obviously, the minimal condition is that demands on the target governments 
must be based on organizational rules rather than mere ad hoc interests of the member 
states. Moreover, if the democratic and human rights rules disseminated by the regional 
organizations are clearly defined, consensually shared, and consistently applied among 
their member states, their compliance pull will be high.  
 
Identity. Identity refers to the international community that the target government 
regards as its relevant “in-group” and that it aspires to belong to. Non-member states are 
more likely to be persuaded by international organizations if they identify themselves 
with the community of states represented by these organizations (Checkel 2001: 563; 
Johnston 2001: 499).  
 
Authority. In addition, social learning is more likely to be effective if the agency 
of norm promotion “is an authoritative member of the in-group to which the persuadee 
belongs or wants to belong” (Checkel 2001: 563). Generally, authority is enhanced if 
regional organizations rather than individual states engage in norm promotion and if these 
regional organizations have or aspire to have universal membership in the region rather 
than representing just a narrow selection of regional states. 
 
Resonance. Resonance refers to the cultural or institutional match of a specific 
external rule with the already existing domestic values, norms, practices, and discourses 
in a specific issue-area. The higher the “degree of normative fit“ of an international rule,   9
the more likely the target government will conceive the norm as being legitimate, accept 
it as an obligation, and subsequently translate it into institutional political practice 
(Cortell and Davis 2000: 69). Despite high general identification with an international 
community, the resonance of a specific rule propagated by this community may be low.  
 
Two of these conditions, however, are excluded from the analysis because they 
are likely to be constants in the context of this study. On the one hand, novelty is a 
constant feature because all target states examined here have either been established or 
re-established after the end of the Cold War (such as the Baltic countries or the successor 
countries of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union); or they have at least experienced regime 
change bringing to power new elites. On the other hand, there is no variation in authority 
because the agencies of norm promotion consist in the same set of regional organizations 
for all the cases. 
 
In sum, I propose the following alternative hypothesis based on the social learning 
model: The likelihood of compliance increase with the legitimacy and resonance of the 
norms and the identification of the target state with the international community.. 
 
 
Design and Method 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
(QCA) proposed by Charles Ragin (1987; 2000). In this section, I briefly outline the 
underlying assumptions and goals of QCA and explicate the selection of units of analysis 
and cases. 
 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
 
Charles Ragin defines the essence of qualitative research by its case-orientation. 
Qualitative analysis distinguishes itself from quantitative research not just – or not so 
much – by the (limited) number of cases or the (qualitative) kind of data and 
measurements but by its “holistic character”. Qualitative social researchers look at and 
compare “cases as wholes”: “cases are viewed as configurations – as combinations of 
characteristics” (Ragin 1987: 3). Qualitative research then seeks “to determine the 
different combinations of conditions associated with specific outcomes or processes.” 
(Ragin 1987: 14) As a consequence, qualitative research is less concerned with the 
number of cases than with the variety of conditional configurations. It does not work with 
sampling, frequencies, and probabilities; its methods are logical rather than statistical. It 
is not interested in the general significance and explanatory power of individual variables 
but in their embeddedness in causal fields as either individually or jointly necessary 
and/or sufficient conditions (Ragin 1987: 15-16). This corresponds to the interest of this 
article in discovering the conditions of effective international impact on political change 
in Eastern Europe. 
 
However, qualitative analyses often become more difficult to conduct and 
interpret as the number of cases and variables increases. Commonalities become rare and  10
difficult to identify, the number of possible comparisons increases geometrically, and the 
number of logically possible combinations of causal conditions increases exponentially 
(Ragin 1987: 49-50). Using Boolean algebra, QCA offers a tool to handle more than the 
handful of cases and causal configurations typically analyzed in qualitative research 
without, at the same time, requiring the large n of statistical analyses. It is capable of 
examining complex patterns of interactions between variables and contains procedures to 
minimize these patterns in order to achieve parsimony (Ragin 1987: 121-123). Thus, 
QCA helps to improve qualitative research without having to compromise on its basic 
features.  
 
Basic QCA requires the researcher to conceptualize variables dichotomously and 
use binary data (0/1). “Fuzzy-set” QCA (Ragin 2000) also works with values between 0 
and 1 and thus allows for a more fine-grained and information-rich analysis. However, 
fuzzy-set QCA still requires the researcher to define a theoretically meaningful 
qualitative “breakpoint” and to interpret the intermediate values as degrees of 
membership in the 0 or 1 class of cases. For reasons of simplicity and clarity of 
interpretation, I therefore decided to eliminate theoretically less relevant information and 
to use a binary coding.  
 
The data is arranged as a “truth table”. That is, each conditional configuration 
(combination of values of the independent variables) present in the data set is represented 
as one row together with the associated (“truth”) value of the dependent variable. Finally, 
the truth table is analyzed with procedures of combinatorial logic to arrive at a solution 
specifying a parsimonious combination of necessary and sufficient causes (Ragin 1987: 
86-99).  
  
Case Selection and Units of Analysis 
 
The analysis is restricted to problematic cases, that is, East European countries in which 
there was substantial initial conflict between European political norms and state behavior. 
The most important substantive reason for this selection is the interest of the research 
project in the impact and effectiveness of international norm promotion rather than more 
generally in the causes of democratization or democratic consolidation per se. 
Unproblematic cases of democratic transition and consolidation either did not trigger 
specific activities by regional organizations at all or generated largely redundant 
supportive measures. This also has methodological implications. In the problematic 
cases, it is easier to distinguish the international impact from endogenous change, that is, 
change that would have occurred in the absence of international norm promotion. 
  
Based on these considerations, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, and 
Slovenia were excluded from the list of countries, as these countries had achieved a high 
degree of democratic consolidation before EU or NATO membership incentives set in.
8 
The further selection was guided by the aim to include a high degree of variation in the 
independent variables and their combination. Since it was difficult to estimate the values 
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democracies in the early 1990s. See www.freedomhouse.org.  11
of the independent variables for all variables and countries – especially with regard to the 
domestic variables of resonance and costs – the analysis is based on countries from 
different parts of the region, with different conflicts and domestic situations, in the hope 
that these differences would in turn guarantee high variation on the independent variables 
both longitudinally for the development of the country and horizontally across countries. 
The selection of Belarus, the Baltic countries of Estonia and Latvia, Slovakia, Romania, 
Serbia and Montenegro, Cyprus, and Turkey includes northeastern, central European and 
southeastern countries as well as countries with or without ethnic conflicts, democratic 
governments, a credible membership perspective, or a communist legacy.
9  
 
However, the units of analysis in this qualitative comparative study are not countries 
at the aggregate level but time- and issue-specific conditional configurations. The 
country cases are subdivided according to time periods and issues if the value of at least 
one independent variable changes from one time period to another or from one issue-area 
to another. Temporal subdivisions most often result from changes in the credibility of the 
membership incentive and changes in government (entailing changes in resonance and 
costs). Issue subdivisions most often involve those between general liberal democratic 
norms, minority rights, and issues of secession, entailing variation in legitimacy, 
resonance, and costs. As a consequence, the number of cases is not only higher than the 
number of countries (42 cases for 9 countries) but also varies strongly among the 
countries – between 1 (for Belarus and Montenegro, with no relevant changes in 
conditions over time and among issues) and 9 (for Estonia with 3 separate issues and up 
to 4 time periods).  
 
 
Variables 
 
In this section, I will describe the conceptualization of the variables. In general, the study 
is designed as a theory-testing qualitative study of the conditions under which European 
regional organizations have an effective impact on political change in the Eastern Europe. 
The variables are conceptualized dichotomously according to theoretically relevant 
qualitative states: the threshold for a positive value (1) is the expectation – based on the 
competing models – that the quality of the independent variable will enable or further 
compliance. A value of 0 indicates that compliance will be prevented or impeded.  
 
The dependent variable of the study is (target state) compliance with the demands 
of regional organizations. To discriminate between compliance and non-compliance, the 
main indicator is legal rule adoption. A state is considered to be in compliance if it has 
signed a treaty and/or passed a law on the basis of the norm promoted by the regional 
organization. Thus, compliance goes beyond political declarations of acceptance. By 
contrast, norm-conforming implementation of the law is not checked consistently.  
 
                                                           
9 Other potentially interesting countries are Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Croatia, Albania, 
Macedonia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In the end, they were not included because of resource constraints 
and after a quick check suggesting that they would probably not contribute significantly to variation on the 
independent variables.  12
The independent variables of the external incentives model are credible incentives 
(CREDINC) and costs. A value of 1 is assigned to a credible perspective of EU and/or 
NATO membership implying that less sizeable tangible benefits, let alone intangible 
benefits, will not be sufficient to induce compliance in norm-violating target 
governments. In addition, even these high benefits need to be based on a credible promise 
to be effective. Before 1993/1994, when EU and NATO made their general decisions to 
expand to the East, credibility was generally low. Afterwards, it became high for the 
central European countries, which were generally expected to be the main candidates for 
a first round of enlargement, whereas it remained low until later in the decade for the 
other associated countries (the Baltic countries, Bulgaria and Romania). For the 
remaining countries of the “Western Balkans” and Turkey, credibility only turned high in 
1999, when the EU offered membership in connection with its Stability Pact for the 
Balkans and accorded Turkey an explicit “candidate status”. 
 
Costs are low (1) if the adoption of international norms engenders no or negligible 
power costs for the target government. This is the case if compliance is not perceived to 
endanger the dominance of the ethnic core group, to threaten the integrity and security of 
the state, to undermine the target government’s practices of power preservation, or lead to 
a breakdown of the government (a breakdown of the coalition or a loss of parliamentary 
support). Otherwise, domestic costs are considered to block compliance (0).  
 
In the end, international rewards and domestic costs cannot be regarded in 
isolation. Whether a government will comply or not, depends on the net benefits or costs 
attained by comparing rewards and costs. On the one hand, norm-violating governments 
will not adapt to international demands in the absence of a credible promise of NATO or 
EU membership. On the other hand, however, these promises will not lead to compliance 
if domestic power costs are high. In other words, according to the external incentives 
model, high credible incentives and low domestic power costs are assumed to constitute 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions.  
 
For the social learning model, the independent variables are legitimacy, identity 
and resonance. As to legitimacy, consensually shared and consistently applied 
international rules are categorized as “high legitimacy”, which is also the value for the 
expectation of compliance in a social-constructivist perspective (1). If external rules are 
ad hoc, ambiguously defined or inconsistently used, or if they are neither shared nor met 
by (a significant number of) the organization’s member states, their legitimacy is 
considered to be low (0). The general rules of liberal democracy and human rights meet 
the prerequisites of high legitimacy in the Western organizations. The major exception 
are minority rights, which – in contrast with individual non-discrimination rules – do not 
belong to the traditional liberal human rights catalogue of Western democracies, are not 
part of the EU’s acquis communautaire, and are not shared and accepted by all Western 
countries (De Witte 2000: 3; Schwellnus forthcoming). Whereas this lack of legitimacy 
should result in non-compliance according to the social learning model, it should not 
matter according to the external incentives model. 
   13
A positive identification with the European international community is indicated 
if a government consistently presents and describes itself and its state as “Western” 
and/or “European”, as sharing the collective identity, the fundamental values and norms 
of the Western or European community, and as aspiring to belong to this community. By 
contrast, identification is coded 0 if nationalist or other, non-Western or non-European 
identity constructions dominate the public self-descriptions of the government.  
 
Resonance is measured at the level of target state governments, not state 
institutions or general public beliefs. If the principles on which international rules are 
based correspond to, or do not contradict, basic political beliefs and party ideologies, 
resonance is conducive to compliance. In other words, “neutral resonance” is the 
breakpoint for the presence of resonance. Conversely, if international rules contradict the 
party program or ideology of at least one party in government, the situation is “low 
resonance” (0). Again, according to the external incentives model, neither identification 
nor resonance should matter for compliance.  
 
 
Case Descriptions 
 
In this section of the paper, I provide a very brief description of the cases. For reasons of 
space, this description will neither provide data and evidence for the values of the 
variables nor a narrative of how the interplay of variables led to compliance or non-
compliance.
10 The aim here is simply to introduce the main conflicts and factors, which 
characterize each of the country cases, and provide some descriptive background ahead 
of the QCA. 
 
Belarus 
Case 
ID 
CREDINCENT COSTS  LEGITIMACY IDENTITY  RESONANCE  COMPLIANCE 
BEL  0 0  1 0  0 0 
 
In Belarus, the systematic violation of European political norms began when 
President Lukashenka changed the constitution in 1996 and established an autocratic 
regime. Given the absence of a credible membership perspective, a Western identity of 
the political elite, and the resonance of liberal norms with the Lukashenka regime – and 
given high costs of political change – the conditions of compliance were unfavourable 
according to both the external incentives and the social learning model. International 
efforts to promote democratic norms ranging from shunning and sanctioning of the 
Lukashenka regime to constructive engagement through the OSCE’s mission in the 
country have not produced compliance. 
 
Cyprus 
 
In the Cyprus case, the conflict consists in the division of the island, since the Turkish 
invasion of 1974, into the (internationally recognized) Republic of Cyprus in the South 
                                                           
10 The case descriptions and values for the variables are based on a book manuscript on Political 
Conditionality and International Socialization in the New Europe (with Stefan Engert and Heiko Knobel).  14
and the (unrecognized) Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). The norm 
violation resulted from the Turkish rejection of a federative solution and a negotiated 
settlement to unify the island, a long-time demand by both the United Nations and the 
EU. There are two target governments in this case: the government of Turkey (CYPTur) 
and the government of the TRNC (CYPN). For the Turkish government, the conditions 
for compliance have improved over time. Turkey was offered a credible EU membership 
perspective in 1999. In 2002, the AKP with its flexible, non-ideological position on 
Northern Cyprus, won the elections. Finally, even the Turkish military acquiesced in a 
federative solution. This acquiescence removed the major item of domestic power costs 
and led to compliance in 2003. By contrast, conditions remained basically constant on the 
Turkish Cypriot side but, ahead of the 2004 referendum on the unification of Cyprus, it 
complied with the UN Peace Plan nevertheless. 
 
Case ID  CREDINCENT COSTS LEGITIMACY IDENTITY RESONANCE COMPLIANCE
CYPTur-99  0 0  1 1  0  0 
CYPTur-02  1 0  1 1  0  0 
CYPTur-03  1 0  1 1  1  0 
CYPTur+03  1 1  1 1  1  1 
CYPN-03  1 0  1 1  0  0 
CYPN+03  1 0  1 1  0  1 
 
Estonia 
 
In Estonia, international demands focused on three issues linked to the treatment of the 
large Russian-speaking minority in the country: the gradual granting of citizenship to the 
minority (Cit), automatic citizenship for minority children (Ch), and the public use of the 
Russian language (Lan). In addition, the high number of cases results from many changes 
in government. Whereas identification with the West and Europe was constantly high in 
Estonia, the resonance of the minority rights varied depending on the composition of the 
government (strength of nationalist parties). Estonia generally complied with the 
international demands, originally formulated by the OSCE’s High Commissioner for 
National Minorities, after they were linked to EU membership. In the final phase of EU 
accession negotiations, compliance was not even prevented by high domestic costs of 
compliance resulting from divisions within the coalition governments and the absence of 
parliamentary support. 
 
Case ID  CREDINCT COSTS  LEGITIMACY  IDENTITY RESONANCE  COMPLIANCE 
ESTCit-95  0 0  0  1  0  0 
ESTCit-97  0 0  0  1  1  0 
ESTCit-99  1 0  0  1  1  0 
ESTCit+99  1 0  0  1  1  1 
ESTCh-95  0 1  1  1  0  0 
ESTCh-97  0 1  1  1  1  0 
ESTCh+97  1 0  1  1  1  1 
ESTLan-99  0 0  1  1  1  0 
ESTLan+99  1 0  1  1  1  1 
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Latvia 
Case ID  INCENTIVES COSTS  LEGITIMACY IDENTITY  RESONANCE COMPLIANCE 
LATCit-97  0 0  0  1  0 0 
LATCit+97  1 1  0  1  0 1 
LATLan-99  0 0  1  1  0 0 
LATLan+99  1 0  1  1  0 1 
 
In Latvia, the issues were the largely the same as in Estonia but resonance was 
generally lower for the, on average, more nationalist Latvian coalition governments. As 
in the case of Estonia, compliance required credible EU membership incentives. 
 
Montenegro 
 
Case 
ID 
INCENTIVES COSTS  LEGITIMACY IDENTITY  RESONANCE COMPLIANCE
MON  1 0  0  1  1 1 
 
 
In Montenegro, which had become de facto independent from Yugoslavia in the final 
years of the Milošević regime, the EU exercised pressure on the government of Milo 
Djukanović to refrain from declaring formal independence and to agree to a new 
federation of Serbia and Montenegro. After the EU had linked compliance with 
substantial financial subsidies and a membership perspective, the Montenegrin 
government complied in 2002 despite a rift in the coalition.  
 
Romania 
 
Case ID  CREDINCT COSTS LEGITIMACY IDENTITY RESONANCE COMPLIANCE
ROMD-93  0 0  1  0  0  0 
ROMD-96  0 0  1  1  0  0 
ROMD-00  1 1  1  1  1  1 
ROMD+00  1 1  1  1  0  1 
ROMM-93  0 0  0  0  0  0 
ROMM-96  0 0  0  1  0  0 
ROMM-00  1 1  0  1  1  1 
ROMM+00  1 1  0  1  0  1 
 
In Romania, international demands focused on two issues: compliance with general 
liberal democratic norms (ROMD) and with collective minority rights for the Hungarian 
minority (ROMM). In both cases, conditions improved over time: first, when the post-
communist Iliescu government developed an unambiguously Western identification in 
the first half of the 1990s; then with a credible membership perspective and a change in 
government. Even when Iliescu returned to power in 2000 and resonance was reduced 
again, the government continued to comply.  
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Slovakia 
 
Case ID  CREDINCT COSTS LEGITIMACY IDENTITY RESONANCE COMPLIANCE
SLOD-98  1 0  1  0  0  0 
SLOD+98  1 1  1  1  1  1 
SLOM-98  1 0  0  0  0  0 
SLOM+98  1 1  0  1  0  1 
 
In Slovakia, the contentious issues were the same as in Romania. Although the 
country had a credible EU and NATO membership perspective from the start, during the 
Mečiar government (1994-98), which included parties of the extreme left and right 
alongside with the populist HZDS, high domestic power costs and a lack of identification 
and resonance resulted in non-compliance. This changed completely after the 
parliamentary elections 1998 when a broad pro-democratic and pro-European coalition 
under Prime Minister Dzurinda came to power. Whereas Slovakia was denied accession 
negotiations with the EU and NATO in 1997, it was admitted to both organizations in 
2004. 
 
Turkey 
 
Case ID  CREDINCT COSTS  LEGITIMACY IDENTITY RESONANCE  COMPLIANCE
TURDP-
99 
0 1  1  1  0  0 
TURM-
99 
0 0  1  1  0  0 
TUR-02  1 0  1  1  0  0 
TUR+02  1 1  1  1  1  1 
 
In the case of Turkey, the EU demanded the abolition of the death penalty (DP) as 
well as the non-discrimination of the Kurdish minority and the civil control of the 
military (M) as conditions for the opening of accession negotiations.
11 Legitimacy and 
identity were high from the beginning but not sufficient to induce compliance. The 
credible membership perspective for Turkey accorded in 1999 alone did not immediately 
result in compliance either. Only the parliamentary elections of 2002, which removed the 
Kemalist parties from power, led to a single-party government of the moderate Islamist 
AKP and resulted in low domestic adoption costs and high resonance, finally brought 
about compliance on all three issues. 
 
                                                           
11 The three issues are combined into one or two cases when conditional configurations are 
identical.  17
Yugoslavia 
 
Case ID  INCENTIVES COSTS LEGITIMACY IDENTITY RESONANCE COMPLIANCE
YUGR-00  0 0  1  0  0 0 
YUGKS-00  1 0  1  0  0 0 
YUGS+00  1 1  1  1  1 1 
YUGIc+00F  1 0  1  1  0 0 
YUGIc+00S  1 1  1  1  0 1 
 
During the Milošević regime (until 2000), domestic power costs of compliance in 
Yugoslavia were high, and identity and resonance were generally low. Despite varying 
incentives and high legitmacy, Yugoslavia did not comply with the democracy conditions 
of the EU’s Regional Approach (R) and Stability Pact (S) nor with the demands of the 
international community regarding the Kosovo (K) province. After the end of the 
Milošević regime, both the conditions and compliance improved. In the case of 
cooperation with the International Tribunal, however, there was a conflict between the 
federal government (F) under President Koštunica and the Serbian government (S) under 
Prime Minister Djindjić, which can be attributed to different domestic adoption costs. 
 
 
Comparative Analysis 
 
Truth Table 
The truth table (Table 1) summarizes and lists the conditional configurations present in 
the data.
12 For each configuration, the table also shows the number of cases and case 
identifiers. The cases cover 17 out of 32 logically possible configurations (2
5 for 5 binary 
independent variables). 
 
Table 1  Truth Table 
CRE
DIN
C 
C
O
ST
S 
LEGITI
MACY 
IDEN
TITY 
RESON
ANCE 
COMPLI
ANCE 
Cases 
1 1  1  1  1  1  CYPTur+03, 
ROMD-00, 
SLOD+98, 
TUR+02, 
YUGS+00 
1 1  1  1  0  1  ROMD+00, 
YUGIc+00S 
1 1  0  1  1  1  ROMM-00 
1 1  0  1  0  1  LATCit+97, 
ROMM+00, 
SLOM+98 
1 0  1  1  1  C 0/1  CYPTur-03  
ESTCh+97, 
ESTLan+99 
1 0  1  1  0  C 0/1  CYPTur-02, CYPN-
                                                           
12 For all results reported here, I used the “crisp-set analysis” procedures in fsQCA 1.1. The 
program can be downloaded at http://www.u.arizona.edu/~cragin/fsqca.htm.   18
03, TUR-02, 
YUGIc+00F 
CYPN+03, 
LATLan+99    
1 0  1  0  0  0  SLOD-98, 
YUGKS+00 
1 0  0  1  1  C 0/1  ESTCit-99  
ESTCit+99, MON 
1 0  0  0  0  0  SLOM-98 
0 1  1  1  1  0  ESTCh-97 
0 1  1  1  0  0  ESTCh-95, 
TURDP-99 
0 0  1  1  1  0  ESTLan-99 
0 0  1  1  0  0  CYPTur-99, 
LATLan-99, 
ROMD-96, TURM-
99 
0 0  1  0  0  0  BEL, ROMD-93, 
YUGR-00 
0 0  0  1  1  0  ESTCit-97 
0 0  0  1  0  0  ESTCit-95, 
LATCit-97, 
ROMM-96 
0 0  0  0  0  0  ROMM-93 
 
Two observations are important at this point. First, one (but only one) bivariate 
combination is systematically missing in the table: costs = 1 and identity = 0. That is, 
there are no cases in which low identity is associated with low costs. Target governments 
with a weak or absent European or Western identity always incur high adoption costs. 
Conversely, target governments with low adoption costs always identify strongly with the 
Western international community. By contrast, a strong Western or European identity 
does not exclude high adoption costs and vice versa. The implications of this observation 
will be discussed below. 
 
Second, three conditional configurations (rows 5, 6 and 8) are contradictory, that is, 
the same configuration of conditions leads to compliance in some cases and non-
compliance in others. In contrast to a probabilistic statistical analysis, a deterministic 
logical analysis cannot incorporate such contradictory results. There are two technical 
solutions to this complication (1987: 113-118). The first is to include frequencies and 
significance to exclude either the positive or negative cases. For instance, one might 
exclude the less frequent outcomes in the contradictory rows. This solution, however, 
would not only “violate the spirit of case-oriented qualitative research” (Ragin 1987: 118) 
but, given the way in which the units of analysis were defined above, also bias the 
analysis in favor of the countries with higher within-country variation. 
 
The second way is to recode all contradictory outcomes as either 0 or 1 or to treat 
them as absent or missing (thereby reducing the configurations to be analyzed from 17 to  19
14).
13 Coding the outcomes as “false” (0) is the conservative option, which yields highly 
certain causal patterns but might exclude further or simpler causally relevant conditional 
configurations (type II error). By contrast, coding them as “true” (1) is more inclusive but 
might overstate the causal effect of some conditional configurations (type I error). The 
configurations produced by the analysis are then better interpreted as conditions under 
which the outcome is possible or probable rather than certain. I will use all three options 
to cover the entire range of interpretations of the outcomes. 
Analysis 
 
The Boolean analysis yields the following results (Table 2) for all three specifications 
of the contradictions. If all contradictions are recoded as compliance cases (outcome 
1), credible membership incentives and a Western/European identity of the target 
governments are jointly sufficient for compliance. If the contradictions are treated as 
missing configurations, this is still one possible solution. However, credible 
incentives are also sufficient in combination with low domestic power costs of the 
target government. Finally, if all contradictions are recoded as non-compliance cases 
(outcome 0), credible incentives, low domestic costs, and a Western/European 
identity are all necessary (and jointly sufficient) to produce compliance. 
 
Table 2  QCA solutions 
 
Contradictory configurations  Solution 
Coded as compliance  credinc AND identity 
Coded as missing  credinc AND identity OR  
credinc AND costs 
Coded as non-compliance  credinc AND costs AND identity 
 
The QCA solutions show three independent variables to be causally relevant. 
Credible incentives figure as a necessary condition in all three solutions combined with 
identity and/or costs. Thus, in the absence of credible membership incentives, there will 
not be compliance even if other conditions are highly favorable (according to the external 
incentives or the social learning model). In particular, the issues of automatic citizenship 
for children born in Estonia and the abolishment of the death penalty in Turkey (before 
1999) show that governments have not acted on these issues without credible 
membership conditionality, even though domestic costs were low. On the other hand, 
credible membership incentives alone are not sufficient to produce compliance. This is 
true for the Mečiar regime in Slovakia, the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia as well as, 
until recently, for Cyprus and Turkey. 
 
The analysis suggests that credible incentives need to be combined with 
Western/European identity or low domestic costs or both. Here, the inconclusiveness of 
the analysis results from the contradictory configurations. Following the conservative 
interpretation of the results, we can be certain to see compliance if credible membership 
incentives, low domestic power costs, and a Western or European identity are jointly 
                                                           
13 Technically speaking, in fsQCA, this third option requires the analyst to specify contradictions 
(together with remainders) as “don’t care”.  20
present (see the first four configurations in the truth table). According to the looser 
interpretations, credible membership incentives may be sufficient in combination with 
either a positive identity or low domestic power costs alone. 
 
Extension 
 
To arrive at more determinate findings, it would be necessary to discriminate more 
clearly between costs and identity and to solve the contradictions. On the one hand, it 
would be helpful to find at least one case combining low costs and low identity. 
However, this is not an easy task. Generally, low identity cases are rare in post-Cold War 
Europe. Most governments identify themselves clearly with the Western or European 
international community. In our selection, there are only 7 cases of low identification, 
concerning above all the Lukashenka regime in Belarus, the Mečiar regime in Slovakia, 
and the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, for these authoritarian or 
autocratic regimes, compliance with liberal democratic norms also involved or still 
involves substantial power costs. To find more cases of low identity, one would have to 
go further east into the post-Soviet space, but then again the combination of non-Western 
identities and autocratic government appears to be even stronger in this region. Thus, it 
may very well be that the absence of the combination low costs/low identity is a fact of 
real political life rather than an artefact of the case selection. 
 
To solve the contradictions, Ragin’s most recommended strategy is to go back to the 
cases and see whether contradictions result from poor conceptualization or omitted 
variables. A Boolean analysis of the contradictions (as suggested by Ragin 1987: 113-
115) reveals that contradictions appear when credible incentives (1), positive identity (1) 
and high domestic costs (0) are combined with either high legitimacy or high resonance. 
In other words, and viewed from the perspective of the model of external incentives, high 
domestic power costs may in some cases permit compliance under otherwise favorable 
conditions. Which are these deviant cases, and do they have features that distinguish 
them from the other high cost cases? 
 
The cases in question are highlighted by italics in the truth table (Table 1): the 
acceptance by the Northern Cyprus government of the UN Peace Plan in 2004 
(CYPN+03); the compliance of the Estonian government, in the course of EU accession 
negotiations, with international demands for more generous rules for citizenship and the 
public use of minority languages (ESTCh+97, ESTCit+99, ESTLan+99); changes in the 
Latvian language law on the eve of the Helsinki summit of European heads of 
government and state in December 1999 (LATLan+99); and the acceptance by the 
government of Montenegro of a federation with Serbia rather than formal independence 
(MON).  
 
Two commonalities of these cases come to mind. First, the high costs in each case do 
not result from general threats to the survival of the regime or the integrity of the state. 
Rather the cases involve democratically elected target governments and result from the 
threat by coalition partners to leave the government or by parties in parliament to 
withdraw support from a minority government. Thus, the costs can be classified as  21
moderately high in comparison to the costs of compliance for authoritarian or autocratic 
governments. Second, most cases concern “endgame” situations between the EU and the 
candidate countries. The government of Northern Cyprus complied immediately before 
the referendum that would decide the inclusion of the Turkish Republic in the EU; 
Estonia (except for the children’s citizenship case) and Latvia complied with demands for 
minority rights in time for accession negotiations to be opened or completed; Montenegro 
gave in just in time before the EU would have canceled the financial aid, on which the 
state budget strongly depends, and excluded the country from the list of membership 
hopefuls. In sum, it appears that the time pressures emanating from the concluding phase 
of high-stake negotiations with regional organizations add sufficiently to the size and 
credibility of the external incentives to overcome moderately high domestic power costs. 
Of course, this plausible ad hoc explanation of the deviant cases would have to be tested 
systematically, for instance, by adding two further variables or by refining the 
conceptualization of the credible incentives and costs variables. And it would need to be 
confirmed independently by additional cases not yet included in the sample. 
 
Indeed, by introducing an “endgame” variable and coding final negotiation phases 
(just ahead of decisions to open or to conclude accession negotiations) as “1”, the 
contradictions disappear – except for the Estonian case of citizenship for children of 
stateless parents, which was solved in December 1998 before the final phase of EU 
accession negotiations. The QCA solution (dropping the single remaining contradictory 
configuration from the analysis) is credinc-AND-costs OR identity-AND-endgame. That 
is, the solution confirms the external incentives model as a sufficient configuration of 
conditions. However, it permits a second sufficient cause: the combination of 
Western/European identity with the pressure of final negotiation phases. This result 
generally mirrors the original analysis, since we can understand “endgame” as a situation 
of particularly high and credible membership incentives for compliance.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The analysis generally corroborates the external incentives model. First, it shows that 
high and credible incentives are necessary for the international promotion of political 
norms to succeed. In the absence of such incentives, external efforts fail to produce 
democratic change in non-compliant countries. Second, however, credible incentives 
alone are not sufficient to bring about such change. They need to be combined with other 
conditions. 
 
The external incentives model suggests that the additional requirement is low 
domestic power costs. This proposition is generally supported by the evidence. Both in 
the original analysis and for the re-specified model, credible incentives and low costs are 
jointly sufficient if contradictory configurations are disregarded. However, this is not the 
only jointly sufficient configuration: a combination of credible incentives (or “endgame” 
negotiations, according to the re-specified model) with positive Western identity is 
sufficient to bring about democratic change as well. Finally, according to the 
conservative interpretation of the original analysis, both costs and identity have to be 
favorable to translate credible incentives into compliance.   22
 
These findings suggest that a mixed model integrating identity into the external 
incentives model works just as well, or even better, as the “pure” model. How can we 
make sense of this result despite the fact that identity is based on an alternative 
theoretical model of international norm promotion? I suggest that a positive identification 
might be interpreted as a factor that reduces the perception or salience of costs. Positive 
identification creates a strong interest in membership in the organizations of the 
“aspiration group” as a basic foreign policy goal. In particular at decisive “moments of 
truth” in or before accession negotiations, governments with a positive identity tend to 
value the membership perspective more highly than moderate short-term costs and to 
comply even if they risk losing power (temporarily). In other words, the endgame 
situation strengthens the “credible incentives” term of the calculation vis-à-vis the 
“domestic costs” term if target governments are favorably disposed toward the regional 
organizations in general. Even in endgame situations, however, this will not work if 
power costs are substantial and durable (regime change) or if identification is low. 
 
In contrast, the conditions of the social learning model are not corroborated by this 
analysis. First, even in the presence of positive identity, high legitimacy, and at least 
neutral resonance, compliance did not follow (see several of the Baltic minority rights 
cases). Second, neither legitimacy nor resonance show up as necessary, let alone 
sufficient, conditions in any of the QCA solutions. Third, the other factor of this model – 
identity – was not relevant alone but only in combination with factors from the external 
incentives model. 
 
This theoretical result confirms the general findings of Kelley (2004) and Kubicek 
(2003) on the basis of a broader selection and greater diversity of countries and issues. 
Conversely, it challenges the general behavioral relevance of individual case studies 
showing social learning processes in international norm promotion in Eastern Europe 
(Checkel 2001; Gheciu 2003). Finally, it adds an analysis of necessary and sufficient 
conditions absent in Kelley’s statistical analysis and Kubicek’s looser comparative 
analysis.  
 
The analysis suggests that the size and credibility of external incentives is the most 
relevant factor for the effectiveness of international norm promotion – at least in the short 
term. The promotion efforts of European regional organizations have not failed when the 
international legitimacy or domestic resonance of international norms was low, or 
because of a lack of “ownership”, but when external incentives were purely social rather 
than material, too small compared to the domestic costs of adaptation, or not based on 
credible promises. However, whether political changes wrought by membership 
conditionality will be sustainable after accession remains to be seen. In addition, in light 
of this analysis, the era of effective political norm promotion in Europe may be coming to 
an end. On the one hand, the EU is proposing a “New Neighborhood Policy” for the 
“Wider Europe” (in the East and across the Mediterranean) that explicitly excludes the 
promise of membership. On the other hand, the autocratic or authoritarian governments 
are likely to lack the Western identity and to reject the power costs and the risks of 
regime change that come with the conditionality of the European regional organizations.  23
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